The partnership between India and the Soviet Union was widely regarded as a success story throughout the Cold War, and although the two countries did not completely believe in the same values, they had no serious conflict of interest and shared a model of mutually beneficial policies. While, anti-imperialism, socialistic values of elevating the poor, and the United States interest in Pakistan where drivers of India’s very friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the latter never stopped to express time and time again that it wanted to see India emerge as a powerful country. An example to such would be Indo-Soviet economic and military exchanges post the Stalin period, who never held India in high regards because of its non-alignment, as a new Soviet-India relation developed under leadership of various premier’s and prime ministers such as Nikita Khrushchev and Jawaharlal Nehru, Leonid Brezhnev and Indira Gandhi, and Rajiv Gandhi and Mikhail Gorbachev. The relationship developed as Soviets provided a base for India’s growth through its First Five Year Trade Agreement, and assistance during the subsequent economic plans. Further as India fell short of capital, foreign exchange and technology, the Soviets filled this gap by letting India pay in rupees for projects through existing arrangements. Strategically, the Soviets were India’s biggest supporters in multilateral organisations and in regional tensions when India looked to use force of national security. The Soviet Veto on Goa, its pro-India stance on Kashmir in the United Nations and its help through the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty in1971 were some of the key examples of how close this relationship was. And, as the disintegration of Soviet Union laid down a path for the United States to emerge as a global hegemon, India was put to test on the existing policies that it had in the absence of its most favourable ally. So, this essay looks to map the repercussions that India had face and the “strategic hedging” that India embarked on in a post-Soviet world because of the event.

The Soviet disintegration laid  principle problems for India because of its existing foreign policy:

Balance of Payment – Trade in rupees was an important element of Indian economy in1980s. For instance, exports in to communist countries in the Eastern European Bloc in 1980 comprised of 22.1% of total trade, while imports of goods such as manufacturing capital, weapons and equipment were financed through long term trade credits under the Rupee Agreement System. While almost 95% of this trade was between the Soviets and India, the latter enjoyed a huge surplus trade balance. As several Eastern European countries broke away from the Soviet Union with Gorbachev’s introduction of Glasnot, several Rupee Arrangements were terminated as well. Further, the disintegration of Soviet Union, also created a domino effect for Communist governments to fall rapidly as seen in Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Romania. This in turn sparked political tensions around the world and in India on the validity of socialist ideologies in both economic diplomacy and foreign policy strategies as the world looked to embrace an open market system.

Geo-political pressure –Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, preventing nuclear proliferation became of forefront of strategic thinking for countries in the West. As there existed uncertainty on the new Russian policy as it looked to develop friendly relations with the US through treaties such as the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, it became evident for India that a Russian rescue may become uncertain. Further, the United States had now the opportunity to put full pressure on India to sign the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that the Indian Government had continued to deny. However, the United States had always been a pioneer of coercion in several instances and now it had a leverage over India on preventing nuclear weapon proliferation as theories of an all-out nuclear war, mutually assured destruction and nuclear deterrence lost validity in the new world order. Further, as the interest of Western Countries were mainly guided under economic diplomacy to prevent a communist regime from emerging, India now faced a significant issue with regards to who would it rely on. The new Russia now looked to woo the western bloc in the quest of aid and new trading partnerships, a natural ally for third world countries like the Soviets who believed in socialism became absent in this new world order. Thus, for India, its policy on non-alignment now faced an existential question.

As the west emerged to be the sole super power in this new system of geo-politics, India looked to re-engage with the rest of the world with a new foreign policy vision. While, Rajiv Gandhi’s state visit and economic liberalisation played an important factor in showing India’s intention to engage in the free emerging world, the nuclear weapon tests in played an important role. When India conduced the Pokhran nuclear weapon tests in May 1998, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution 1172 which called for them to immediately stop their nuclear programme under clause 7. However, the resolution was acted under Chapter 6 of the Security Council which did not have the capability to penetrate national sovereignty guided under Article 2(7), thus giving India the ability to continue its programme and in turn look to woo George W. Bush to sign the historic Indo-US Nuclear Agreement in 2008 prior to which India brought the civil nuclear program under international safeguards while Bush carved an exception for India within the United States policy. This engagement with Bush, who believed in the role of India as one of the largest democracies and the correct option to hedge against China, also allowed India to strengthen relationships with US allies in Europe and Asia.

India’s protectionist economic policy in the cold war era also did much damage to its commercial links with Africa, West Asia and South East Asia. Further, its interaction with political leaders of its neighbouring countries and continents was limited to Non-Aligned Movement and G77 Conferences. Pressing further on this issue, one could argue that situations were never in favour of India although it believed in the correct value. For example, it won a lot of goodwill with regards to its ending apartheid in Africa stance but it lost to the current economic engagement that African countries were looking to. Another key example would the Iraq-Iran War and Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait where India suffered a heavy blow with regards to its anti-Imperial ideology, as the West were looked as liberators. Further, its close relations with the Soviet Union had also influenced instances where the East looked to China as an alternative, such as its support for Vietnam intervention in Cambodia. Thus, tore-engage economic diplomacy was a must which became easier to introduce with the economic liberalisation as former Prime Minister Narsimha Rao looked to induce it in foreign policy as seen in his letter to the Ministry of External Affairs. This gave birth to the famous policies such as the Look East, Look West Asia and a platform to re-engage freely with Africa.

Another key strategic hedging that it focussed on was in trying to stabilize the growing resentment for India’s muscular policy by Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi in South Asia. Indian foreign policy towards its neighbours were previously guided by ideal values. The Gujral Doctrine by former prime minister Indra Kumar Gujral which called for India to not ask for reciprocity but give and accommodate what can be done became a major inspiration for subsequent prime ministers like Atal Bihari Vajpaee and Dr. Manmohan Singh to better relationship with its immediate neighbours. Its campaign for Afghanistan’s membership in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in 2005,engagement with Myanmar through the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, renegotiation of 1949 Bhutan Agreement in2006, Atal Bihari Vajpaee’s willingness to review the 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty and framework agreements on economic cooperation with Bangladesh and Maldives became some key moves for India to gain importance from its neighbours.

Although one might argue that such a hedging was needed a lot before to have a successful implementation as the collapse of the Soviet Union was mostly a ‘grey rhino’. I conclude to the fact that India’s response to such fundamental crisis has mostly been effective to create and strategize what India now has become a pioneer of as the West, which despised India, is now looking for its cooperation in competing against the new bi-polar China.

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